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The conventional way of analyzing abortion and religion presumes that
abortion rights are the normative baseline grounded in constitutionalism, rationality,
scientific fact, and non-discrimination.1 Religion, to the degree that it contradicts
that normative baseline, is implicitly the opposite: aberrant, constitutionally suspect,
harmful, irrational, unscientific, and discriminatory.2 Once the matter is framed that
* Harwell G. Davis Professor of Constitutional Law, Cumberland Law School, Samford
University. The author thanks Claire Horner for her review of and comments on a prior draft of this
article, and Emma Cummings for her excellent research assistance.
1. See Erwin Chemerinsky & Michele Goodwin, Abortion: A Woman’s Private Choice, 95
TEX. L. REV. 1189 (2017); Erwin Chemerinsky, Rationalizing the Abortion Debate: Legal Rhetoric and
the Abortion Controversy, 31 BUFF. L. REV. 107 (1982); Justin Buckley Dyer, The Constitution, Congress
and Abortion, 11 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 394 (2017); Huseina Sulaimanee, Note, Protecting the Right to
Choose: Regulating Conscience Clauses in the Face of Moral Obligation, 17 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 417,
419 (2011) (“This Note argues that provider conscience clauses for abortion services not only deny
women a fundamental right guaranteed by the United States Constitution, but they also violate informed
consent principles and the separation of church and state set out in the Establishment Clause.”).
2. See PAUL A. OFFIT, BAD FAITH: WHEN RELIGIOUS BELIEF UNDERMINES MODERN
MEDICINE (2015); Erwin Chemerinsky & Michele Goodwin, Religion Is Not a Basis for Harming Others,
104 GEO. L.J. 1111 (2016); Michele Goodwin & Allison M. Whelan, Constitutional Exceptionalism, 2016
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way, the question of whether to grant religious liberty exceptions to the normative
baseline is problematic. To the degree such exceptions are allowed, the
constitutionally-based normative baseline has been breached. Rationality has given
way to irrationality, science to superstition, equality to discrimination, protection to
harm.
Of course, these presumptions are usually implicit rather than explicit. But it
is these structures of thought, these presuppositions behind the analysis, that have
been formative.
This article turns these presumptions on their head. Upon examination, the
abortion liberty is based on the raw assertion of judicial power without resort or
regard to reason. Rather than being a right grounded in science, the abortion right
has obscured and confused the relevant science. It is religious liberty, rather than
the abortion liberty, that should define the constitutional baseline, given the explicit
protection of religious freedom in the First Amendment and the lack of any
equivalent textual, structural, or historical support for the abortion liberty.3 The
abortion right movement is profoundly discriminatory, denying the unborn, even at
nine months of pregnancy, the right to recognition as a person before the law,4
while seeking to discriminate against religious persons and organizations who object
to participating in abortion. Further, upon examination it is the abortion rights
movement that has little interest or respect for the conscience and viewpoints of
women in regard to abortion. The abortion liberty, in turning the woman against
her offspring, protects neither and harms both. It is the abortion liberty that is the
aberration in relationship to our society’s fundamental values and norms.
Thus, religion’s role in regard to abortion is primarily that of calling society to
apply to the abortion issue society’s own values of rationality, respect for human
dignity, constitutionalism, democratic governance, science, and non-discrimination.
Further, resistance to the abortion right is grounded not in idiosyncratic religious
dogma or irrational belief, but in presuppositions shared broadly in American
society. Hence, religion and religious organizations involved in anti-abortion
activism are not seeking an aberrant exception to society’s norms, but rather are
participants in a broader movement founded in the most fundamental norms of our
society.

U. ILL. L. REV. 1287, 1329 (2016); Louise Melling, Religious Refusals to Public Accommodations Laws:
Four Reasons to Say No, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 177 (2015); Sarah M. Stephens, The Search for
Authenticity and Manipulation of Tradition: Restrictions on Women’s Reproductive Rights in the United
States and Egypt, 19 CARDOZO J.L & GENDER 325, 327 (2013). On the problem of competing
“rationalities,” see ALALDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? (1988). On the
debate over whether religion is intrinsically irrational, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is Religious Freedom
Irrational?, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1043 (2014), reviewing BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION?
(2013).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973).
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I. RAW JUDICIAL POWER WITHOUT RECOURSE TO REASON
The abortion rights movement has generally relied on the Supreme Court’s
abortion decisions for legitimation of the abortion rights position, while at the same
time often seeking, literally or in effect, to rewrite those decisions in order to make
them more persuasive.5 Abortion rights organizations reflexively defend Roe v.
Wade6 as foundational and view any threat to that decision as an attack upon
abortion rights.7 Yet, unlike other foundational modern Supreme Court decisions,
such as Brown v. Board of Education,8 the Court’s abortion decisions have failed to
create consensus in society or settle the underlying issue.9 Hence, as a matter of
persuasion and rhetoric, rather than power, the Court’s abortion decisions have
failed. Upon examination, the reasons for this failure become apparent. Roe v. Wade
and the Court’s subsequent abortion rights decisions lack foundation in reason, in
the literal sense of failing to provide reasons for the Court’s central abortion holdings.
The Court has been eloquent in justifying its own authority to create binding rules
on abortion for the entire nation, but at key analytical points has provided little in
the way of justification for those rules.
A. Roe v. Wade
Prior to Roe v. Wade, state legislation and enforcement were the primary
determinants of abortion law and policy in the United States.10 Advocating actively
in that realm, the abortion rights movement had substantial, but incomplete, success
particularly in the decade prior to Roe v. Wade.11 Thus, in 1900, almost all states
prohibited abortion throughout pregnancy, with the only exception being for the
life of the mother.12 On the eve of Roe v. Wade, only about thirty states, including

5. See WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID ( Jack M. Balkin ed., 2005); Jack M. Balkin,
Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291 (2007); Michele Goodwin & Meigan
Thompson, In the Shadow of the Court: Strategic Federalism and Reproductive Rights, 18 GEO. J. GENDER
& L. 333 (2017); Yvonne Lindgren, The Rhetoric of Choice: Restoring Healthcare to the Abortion Right,
64 HASTINGS L.J. 385 (2013); Reva Siegal, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion
Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261 (1992).
6. Roe, 410 U.S. 113.
7. See, e.g., About Us, NARAL PRO-CHOICE AMERICA, https://www.prochoiceamerica.org/
about/ [https://perma.cc/WUB9-PGU3] (last visited July 10, 2018); Roe v. Wade,
PLANNED PARENTHOOD, https://www.plannedparenthoodaction.org/issues/abortion/roe-v-wade
[https://perma.cc/3RXE-NTSB] (last visited July 10, 2018).
8. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
9. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Roe v. Wade, An Engine of Controversy, in WHAT ROE V. WADE
SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra note 5, at 3.
10. Joseph Dellapenna, The History of Abortion: Technology, Morality and Law, 40
U. PITT. L. REV. 359, 407 (1979).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 406; Harvey M. Adelstein, Note, The Abortion Law, 12 W. RESERVE L. REV. 74, 75
(1960); Mark A. Graber, The Ghost of Abortion Past: Pre-Roe Abortion Law in Action, 1 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y
& L. 309 (1994); Zad Leavy & Jerome M. Kummer, Criminal Abortion: Human Hardship and Unyielding
Laws, 35 S. CAL. L. REV. 123, 127–28 (1962); Jone Johnson Lewis, Abortion History: The Controversy
in the U.S., THOUGHTCO. (Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.thoughtco.com/history-of-abortion-3528243
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Texas, retained this strict form of abortion prohibition.13 Four jurisdictions had
created elective abortion statutes, legalizing abortion to various points in the second
trimester.14 A significant group of about thirteen states had enacted legislation
similar to the Model Penal Code (MPC),15 providing for fairly broad categories of
permissible abortions through an expansion of the concept of therapeutic
abortion.16
Roe v. Wade invalidated the abortion laws of all states and the District of
Columbia, including the recently enacted statutes of the elective abortion
jurisdictions.17 Roe replaced localized democratic governance of abortion with
nationalized judicial governance, at least as to the core issue of legalizing elective
abortion until viability.18 Further, the Court’s legalization of elective abortion
through viability, which in 1973 meant through two-thirds of pregnancy, was in the
global context a rather extreme settlement of the issue at the time, extending elective
abortion beyond that of most European states.19
Commentators and Justices have noted the lack of support for Roe in the text,
history, or structure of the Constitution.20 For example, Justice White noted in
dissent:
I find nothing in the language or history of the Constitution to support
the Court’s judgment. The Court simply fashions and announces a new
constitutional right for pregnant mothers and, with scarcely any reason or
authority for its action, invests that right with sufficient substance to
override most existing state abortion statutes . . . . As an exercise of raw
judicial power, the Court perhaps has authority to do what it does today;
but, in my view, its judgment is an improvident and extravagant exercise
[https://web.archive.org/web/20180608162322/https://www.thoughtco.com/history-of-abortion3528243].
13. Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Before (and After) Roe v. Wade: New Questions About
Backlash, 120 YALE L.J. 2028 (2011).
14. David J. Garrow, Abortion Before and After Roe v. Wade: A Historical Perspective, 62
ALB. L. REV. 833 (1999).
15. MODEL PENAL CODE (AM. LAW INST. 1962).
16. Jon F. Merz et al., A Review of Abortion Policy: Legality, Medicaid Funding, and Parental
Involvement, 1967-1994, 17 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 1, 4 (1995).
17. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165 (1973); see also Merz et al., supra note 16, at 5; Rachael
K. Pirner & Laurie B. Williams, Roe to Casey: A Survey of Abortion Law, 32 WASHBURN L.J. 166, 171–
72 (1993).
18. Id.
19. See MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW (1987); Julia
L. Ernst et al., The Global Pattern of U.S. Initiatives Curtailing Women’s Reproductive Rights: A
Perspective on the Increasingly Anti-Choice Mosaic, 6. U. PA. J. CONST. L. 752, 759 (2004); see also Abortion
Legislation in Europe, LIBR. CONGRESS, https://www.loc.gov/law/help/abortion-legislation/
europe.php#comparative [https://perma.cc/W4HA-7DLG] (last updated Sept. 15, 2016).
20. See Teresa Stanton Collett, Judicial Modesty and Abortion, 59 S.C. L. REV. 701 (2008); Clarke
D. Forsythe & Stephen B. Presser, The Tragic Failure of Roe v. Wade: Why Abortion Should Be Returned
to the States, 10 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 85 (2005); Paul Benjamin Linton & Kevin J. Todd, The Framers
Did Not Incorporate a Right to Abortion, 81 ILL. B.J. 31 (1993); Paul Benjamin Linton, Planned
Parenthood v. Casey: The Flight from Reason in the Supreme Court, 13 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 15, 17
(1993).
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of the power of judicial review that the Constitution extends to this
Court.21
In Roe, the long historical passages perhaps obscured for some the Court’s
creation of something quite new in the Constitution. Nevertheless, the pretense of
Roe v. Wade as a historically grounded, originalist decision never was very persuasive
to most people on either side of the issue. Thus, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,22 the
Court was ready to concede that Roe was based on an evolving interpretative method
not bounded by historical understandings.23 Thus, the Court conceded that Roe
“was, of course, an extension” of prior substantive due process precedents which
themselves had gone through a period of development.24 Indeed, the Court
specified that its interpretations of substantive due process were not historically
bounded and thus were continually open to new extensions not bounded by the
original intention.25 Hence, the Court ultimately rested the authority of Roe on the
Court’s own “reasoned judgment,”26 which was not bounded by text, history,
tradition, or precedent.27
This reliance on the Court’s own “reasoned judgment,” unbounded by
traditional sources of interpretation, would seem to require that the Court provide
clear justifications and reasons for its specific holdings.28 This is particularly true
since the Court admitted that abortion was a matter that required not just
acknowledgment of the woman’s right but also a weighing of that right against other
interests, including especially the State’s interest in protecting “prenatal life.”29 Thus,
the core dilemma in Roe is how to balance or weigh the competing rights or interests
of the pregnant woman and the human embryo or fetus. This dilemma is what
separates the abortion issue from many other sexuality issues, as indeed the Court
conceded in Roe itself.30
Roe failed to provide “reasons” for its weighing of the respective rights and
interests. This difficulty begins with the section of Roe that holds that the unborn,
even at nine months gestation, are not constitutional persons under the Fourteenth
Amendment.31 The Court decided this issue solely on originalist grounds.32 Amidst
the many pages of Roe and all of the Court’s subsequent abortion decisions,
however, there is not one word of explanation or justification for the Court using
an originalist method of interpretation in evaluating the constitutional rights of the
21. Roe, 410 U.S. at 221–22.
22. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
23. Id. at 854.
24. Id. at 853.
25. Id. at 849.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 853.
30. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973).
31. Id. at 158.
32. Id. at 156–59. For a contrasting analysis of the personhood question from an originalist
perspective, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Plausibility of Personhood, 74 OHIO STATE L. J. 14 (2012).
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unborn, while using a far more generous, evolving method of constitutional
interpretation when evaluating the claim of abortion rights.33 Obviously the Court
is stacking the deck by using a rather generous interpretative method to evaluate
one set of rights claims while using another, much stricter interpretative method to
evaluate the competing set of rights claims. The choice is even more peculiar when
one considers the immense changes in medical and scientific knowledge about
prenatal life, which would seem to provide an excellent basis for evolving
constitutional understanding of the rights of the unborn. Certainly, medical and
scientific knowledge of human procreation and prenatal life was rudimentary in
1787 and 1868 as compared to 1973.34 However, the Court, in Roe and ever since
Roe, has evaluated rights and interests pertaining to the unborn without ever
discussing the biological facts of embryonic and fetal development. Similarly, the
Court has failed to discuss developments in medical knowledge about the fetus or
how what we know now is different than what was thought at the time of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
This claimed reliance on originalist analysis and precedent as to the rights of
the unborn allows the Court to frame abortion as a clash between the rights of the
woman and state interests in prenatal life, rather than as the clash of rights between
persons. Further, the Court makes this essential analytic move without a single word
of true explanation, as though its holding is dictated by history and precedent––
which of course it is not, since in Roe the Court was bound by neither history nor
precedent as to the woman’s right.
The Roe Court’s encounter with the unborn in the guise of a medical and
scientific reality occupies only a few lines of Roe. Here, the Court famously admits:
“The pregnant woman cannot be isolated in her privacy. She carries an embryo and,
later, a fetus, if one accepts the definitions of the developing young in the human
uterus.”35
The Court then issues another famous pronouncement:
Texas urges that, apart from the Fourteenth Amendment, life begins
at conception and is present throughout pregnancy, and that, therefore, the
State has a compelling interest in protecting that life from and after
conception. We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins.
When those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy,
and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this

33.
34.

Roe, 410 U.S. at 179.
See Salim Al-Gailani & Angela Davis, Introduction to “Transforming Pregnancy Since 1900,”
47 STUD. HIST. & PHIL. BIOLOGICAL & BIOMEDICAL SCI. 229 (2014); Karen Wellner, A History
of Embryology (1959), by Joseph Needham, EMBRYO PROJECT ENCYCLOPEDIA ( June 28, 2010),
https://embryo.asu.edu/pages/history-embryology-1959-joseph-needham [https://perma.cc/
Q2LG-6ZCV]; Women, Power, and Reproductive Healthcare, OHSU, http://www.ohsu.edu/xd/
education/library/about/collections/historical-collections-archives/exhibits/women-power-andreproductive.cfm [https://perma.cc/8PCV-ZZNQ] (last visited July 10, 2018).
35. Roe, 410 U.S. at 159.

First to Printer_Smolin (Do Not Delete)

2018]

ABORTING REASON AND EQUALITY

9/10/2018 10:26 AM

679

point in the development of man’s knowledge, is not in a position to
speculate as to the answer.36
The Court’s statement is unscientific. There is no reasonable scientific debate
as to whether an embryo or fetus at risk of being surgically aborted is an individual
human life. The embryo and fetus are genetically distinct from the pregnant woman;
approximately half are a different gender from the mother.37 Clearly the embryo and
fetus are not merely a part of the woman’s body. Embryonic and fetal life from a
strictly scientific perspective are merely stages in the development and life of the
human organism: as are, of course, infancy, childhood, and adolescence.38 Hence, a
standard Embryology textbook states:
Human development is a continuous process that begins when an
ovum from a female is fertilized by a sperm from a male . . . . Most
developmental changes occur during the embryonic and the fetal periods,
but important changes also occur during the other periods of development:
childhood, adolescence, and adulthood . . . Although it is customary to
divide development into prenatal and postnatal periods, it is important to
realize that birth is merely a dramatic event during development resulting
in a distinct change in environment.39
The post-Roe development of Assisted Reproductive Technologies (ART),
including especially in vitro fertilization (IVF), has raised new bioethical issues and
caused some to consider a different status for the pre-implantation embryo.40 While
the very early embryo is still a genetically distinct living human organism, the
capacity for twinning and the high wastage rate, along with the medical practice of
ART, has contributed to inconsistent use of the terminology of “pre-embryo” for
the pre-implantation embryo, although the term does not seem to have become
predominant.41 In addition, since Roe, pregnancy has been redefined in many
official medical contexts as occurring at implantation rather than at fertilization,
although apparently many physicians still prefer the conception or fertilization
definition.42 In any event, the period between fertilization and implantation is not
relevant to the question of surgical abortion that was before the Court in Roe.
36. Id.
37. Steven N. Austad, The Human Prenatal Sex Ratio: A Major Surprise, 112 PNAS 4839
(2015); Steven Orzack et al., The Human Sex Ratio from Conception to Birth, PNAS, Mar. 30, 2015, at
E2102.
38. See, e.g., AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS, BRIGHT FUTURES: GUIDELINES FOR HEALTH
SUPERVISION OF INFANTS, CHILDREN, AND ADOLESCENTS ( Joseph F. Hagan, Jr., et al. eds., 4th
ed. 2017); KEITH MOORE ET AL., THE DEVELOPING HUMAN: CLINICALLY ORIENTATED
EMBRYOLOGY (10th ed. 2015).
39. See KEITH L. MOORE, THE DEVELOPING HUMAN: CLINICALLY-ORIENTATED
EMBRYOLOGY (3d ed. 1982). Moore’s text is now in the Tenth Edition. See infra note 39. The first
edition was published in 1973, the year Roe was decided.
40. See, e.g., GREGORY E. PENCE, MEDICAL ETHICS 96–139 (6th ed. 2011).
41. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (1992) (quoting the American Fertility Society).
42. See Kerry Grens, When Does Pregnancy Begin? Doctors Disagree, REUTERS (Nov. 17, 2011,
11:21 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-when-does-pregnancy-begin/when-does-pregnancybegin-doctors-disagree-idUSTRE7AG24B20111117 [https://perma.cc/FZ8V-YP7V].
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Certainly, by the time that a pregnancy can be established and surgical abortion is
an option, there is no medical issue as to whether the human organism is biologically
alive, human, and distinct—genetically or otherwise—from the pregnant woman.
Of course if the embryo or fetus is dead, an abortion, as understood in the
law, would no longer be possible, since removal of a dead fetus is by definition not
an abortion.43 Indeed, a dead fetus is generally an indication for medical
intervention.44 By contrast, the physician’s alleged failure to appropriately intervene
to preserve the life and health of the fetus during pregnancy or labor, leading to
neonatal death or the birth of an infant with health impairments, is a common cause
of medical malpractice claims.45 It is here that the Court casts doubt on what are
medical and scientific certainties that courts and the medical field otherwise in
practice treat as settled facts. Certainly an obstetrician who could not tell the
difference between a dead or live fetus would not be fit to practice. The Court
completely confuses a philosophical, theological, or legal debate on the status and
characterization of human prenatal life, often termed the debate on
“personhood,”46 with the established medical and scientific facts about the embryo
and fetus as stages of human development.47
This distinction between the “personhood” debate and the scientific facts of
human development is illustrated by the debate over the status of the neonate and
infant.48 Certainly some people, both in modern times and also in the past, have
regarded early infancy as a stage prior to the attainment of “personhood,” and some
have used this exclusion from personhood to justify or minimize the harm of
infanticide.49 However, that does not change the scientific certainty that infants are
43. See Abortion, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1983) (defining abortion as the “knowing
destruction of the life of an unborn child or the intentional expulsion or removal of an unborn child
from the womb other than . . . removing a dead fetus”).
44. HARVEY J. KLIMAN, INTRAUTERINE FETAL DEATH (2004), https://medicine.yale.edu/
obgyn/kliman/placenta/research/Fetal%20Death%20UpToDate%202Feb04_196028_284_18220_v
1.pdf [https://perma.cc/J6K7-WWDZ].
45. See J.I.B. Adinma, Litigations and the Obstetrician in Clinical Practice, 6 ANN. MED. HEALTH
SCI. RES. 74 (2016); Robert J. Stiller, 4 Ways to Lower Your Risk of an Obstetric Malpractice Suit,
MODERNMEDICINE NETWORK (Apr. 1, 2014), http://www.contemporaryobgyn.net/health-lawpolicy/4-ways-lower-your-risk-obstetric-malpractice-suit [https://perma.cc/JW5B-LDZ6].
46. See, e.g., PENCE, supra note 40, at 82–84, 152; Mary Midgley, Persons and Non-Persons, in IN
DEFENSE OF ANIMALS 52 (Peter Singer ed., 1985); Mary Anne Warren, On the Moral and Legal Status
of Abortion, 57 MONIST 43 (1973), reprinted in THOMAS A. MAPPES & DAVID DEGRAZIA, BIOMEDICAL
ETHICS 456 (4th ed. 1973).
47. See MOORE ET AL., supra note 38.
48. See, e.g., PENCE, supra note 40, at 152; SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES ON MEDICAL
ETHICS 270 (George Weisz ed., 1990) (discussing the status of personhood conferred on neonates).
49. See LARRY W. HURTADO, DESTROYER OF THE GODS, EARLY CHRISTIAN
DISTINCTIVENESS IN THE ROMAN WORLD 144–48 (2016) (discussing Roman practice of infant
exposure); JAMES Z. LEE & WANG FENG, ONE QUARTER OF HUMANITY: MALTHUSIAN
MYTHOLOGY AND CHINESE REALITIES, 1700 – 2000, at 61 (1999); PENCE, supra note 40, at 152;
MICHAEL TOOLEY, ABORTION AND INFANTICIDE (1983); Alberto Giubilini & Francesca Minerva,
After-Birth Abortion: Why Should the Baby Live?, 39 J. MED. ETHICS 261 (2012); William Saletan, AfterBirth Abortion, SLATE (Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/
human_nature/2012/03/after_birth_abortion_the_pro_choice_case_for_infanticide_.html
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live human organisms, nor does it allow us to accurately refer to the neonate as
“potential life”––as the Supreme Court wrongfully refers to the fetus.50 An antiabortion state legislator was recently ridiculed and criticized for not realizing that
removal of a dead fetus is not an abortion, leading to discussions of the difficult
experience of carrying a dead fetus whose heart is not beating and who is no longer
moving––although the legislator corrected her error within a day.51 The obvious
question is why the Supreme Court is not similarly ridiculed for not realizing that
the fetus subject to an abortion is clearly and by medical and legal definition alive—
a mistake the Court has failed to correct over many decades.
Some might argue that the Court’s confusion is an insignificant mistake in
terminology rather than substance. There clearly is a debatable question of
“personhood,”52 and some within that debate could label the fetus as a “potential
person,” and hence the fact that the Court uses the wrong terminology and speaks
about uncertainty over when “life begins” and refers to “potential life” is arguably
insignificant. To the contrary, however, this error matters. It matters that the Court
obscures and negates the scientific fact that the fetus is an individual human life,
for it allows the Court, in confronting the legal issues, to avoid responsibility for the
creation of legal rules that strip personhood and state protection from organisms
that are clearly individual human lives. The refusal to acknowledge the scientific
certainties about the embryo and fetus also lead the Court to never, in hundreds of
pages of opinions on abortion, review the scientific literature on embryonic and
fetal development. One would think that our nation’s definitive opinions about the
legal status of prenatal life would include a careful review of the medical facts. There
are many points of developmental significance in prenatal human development that
could be discussed. What about the significance of the embryonic development of
the primitive streak at day fifteen? What is the significance of the medical change
in terminology from embryo to fetus at eight weeks of development? When does
the heart start to beat? What is the course of development of the brain and nervous
system? When does fetal hearing begin? What are the characteristic activities of the
fetus in the uterus at various stages of development? What do we know about

[https://web.archive.org/web/20180608171013/http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_
science/human_nature/2012/03/after_birth_abortion_the_pro_choice_case_for_infanticide_.html].
50. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 116 (1973) (stating that “the fetus, at most, represents only
the potentiality of life”); Hutton Brown et al., Legal Rights and Issues Surrounding Conception, Pregnancy,
and Birth, 39 VAND. L. REV. 597, 693, 703 (1986).
51. See Danielle Campoamor, I Carried My Dead Baby to Term & This Is What Anti-Choice
Lawmakers Will Never Understand, ROMPER (Apr. 3, 2017), https://www.romper.com/p/
i-carried-my-dead-baby-to-term-this-is-what-anti-choice-lawmakers-will-never-understand-48720
[https://web.archive.org/web/20180608171729/https://www.romper.com/p/i-carried-my-deadbaby-to-term-this-is-what-anti-choice-lawmakers-will-never-understand-48720]; Lucy Westcott,
A Politician Claims Mistake About Miscarriage in Abortion Debate, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 31, 2017),
http://www.newsweek.com/iowa-abortion-shannon-lundgren-miscarriage-dead-fetus-term-577289
[https://web.archive.org/web/20180617101857/http://www.newsweek.com/iowa-abortion-shannonlundgren-miscarriage-dead-fetus-term-577289].
52. See supra notes 46–49 and accompanying text.
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maternal-fetal interaction, and even bonding? Both Roe v. Wade and subsequent
decisions show a remarkable lack of engagement with the scientific and medical
facts of embryonic and fetal life, which suggests that the nation’s rules for abortion
can be fairly debated and determined without discussing such matters. As
Professor/Judge Noonan summarized well, “[t]he Court’s opinion appeared to rest
on the assumption that the biological reality could be subordinated or ignored by
the sovereign speaking through the Court.”53
The Court’s denial of the scientific facts, and refusal to discuss or analyze the
medical facts about prenatal life, set the stage for debating abortion on an
unscientific basis. The Court’s confusions will become the Nation’s confusion.
Uncertainty about the social construct of “personhood” is not the same as the
Court’s claimed uncertainty about “life,” and that difference matters—analytically,
practically, and rhetorically. This is a category confusion with consequences,
particularly when made and continued by the United States Supreme Court in the
opinions that mandate for the nation the legal rules governing abortion. Given the
prestige of science and medicine, it matters that the Court refuses to acknowledge
the medical and scientific certainties related to the fetus.
Further, the Court’s claim of agnosticism on when “human life begins” clashes
with the Court’s decisions that the unborn throughout pregnancy are not
constitutional persons, and that the State’s interests in fetal life do not become
“compelling” until viability.54 Judicial uncertainty about “when life begins”55 could
rationally lead to providing protection as a precautionary matter, for if there is a
reasonable risk that previable fetuses are human life, one might want to protect
against what otherwise could be millions of deaths. Alternatively, judicial
uncertainty about the status of the unborn could lead the Court to defer to
democratic actors. Instead, the Court defied the medical and scientific certainties
about prenatal life and issued a definitive opinion that mostly stripped the unborn
of legal protections, at least in the context of abortion.56 Indeed, the Court implicitly
criticized Texas for “adopting one theory of life,” as though there were any other
reasonable scientific or medical views of embryonic and fetal life.57 The scientific
facts relating to the embryonic and fetal stages of human life indeed are not a theory
but a matter of reasonable scientific certainty, as is the medical distinction between
a dead and living fetus.58 Similarly, the Court denigrated these scientific certainties
regarding embryonic and fetal life by referring to the State’s interest as “protecting
the potentiality of human life,”59 or “potential life,”60 as though a human fetus
53. John Noonan, Jr., The Root and Branch of Roe v. Wade, 63 NEB. L. REV. 668, 673 (1984).
54. Roe, 410 U.S. at 155–56.
55. Id. at 152, 159.
56. Id. at 158.
57. Id. at 162.
58. See AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS, supra note 38; MOORE ET AL., supra note 38; see also supra
text accompanying note 38.
59. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162.
60. Id. at 163.
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merely has the “potential” for life. Indeed, one can search in vain through many
medical textbooks without finding a single one that states that a human fetus is only
“potentially alive,” which would be just as nonsensical a statement as to assert that
a human neonate or adolescent was only “potentially alive.”61
As to the viability line, the Court’s only explanation is contained in three brief
sentences:
With respect to the State’s important and legitimate interest in
potential life, the ‘compelling point’ is at viability. This is so because the
fetus then presumably has the capacity of meaningful life outside the
mother’s womb. State regulation protective of fetal life after viability thus
has both logical and biological justification.62
As has been long-noted,63 this “seems to mistake a definition for a
syllogism.”64 All the Court has done is restate the definition of viability, without
providing a word of explanation as to why viability is the line. The statement’s
reference to “biological justification” is also a clear misuse of science, for a previable
fetus is not “biologically” less a living human organism than a viable human
organism, particularly since “viability” is not a condition of the fetus but rather of
the relationship between the fetus and changing medical technology.65 Thus, as the
Court will later discover, but was already anticipated at the time of Roe, as medical
technology improves, the definition of viability changes without any corresponding
change in the fetus as a biological organism, creating the odd situation that the legal
status of the fetus changes due to factors completely extrinsic to the fetus.66
Obviously, arguments could be constructed as to why being profoundly
dependent on another, as in the form found in human pregnancy, makes one less
worthy of protection. The Court, however, never bothers to make that argument.
From a pro-life perspective, the opposite would be true, for it is particularly the
responsibility of the State to protect those who are most vulnerable, dependent, and
unable to protect themselves.67 Certainly the weak and dependent are not less
worthy of protection. In any event, debating the Court on viability is useless, for the
Court is not a part of the conversation, having never explained, in Roe or since, why
viability is a satisfactory dividing point for when the State’s interest in prenatal life
61. I will discuss below whether the Court implicitly left this determination of the status of the
unborn with each pregnant woman.
62. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
63. See John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920
(1973).
64. Id. at 924.
65. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion); City of
Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Ely, supra
note 63.
66. See Casey, 505 U.S. 833; Akron, 462 U.S. 416. This problem was noted at the time of Roe. See
Ely, supra note 63.
67. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, 3 Responsibilities Every Government Has Towards Its Citizens,
WORLD ECON. F. (Feb. 13, 2017), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/02/governmentresponsibility-to-citizens-anne-marie-slaughter/ [https://perma.cc/6MJK-FYK9].
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can outweigh the woman’s abortion liberty. The Court may be using its “reasoned
judgment,” but if so, it is not willing to give publicly accessible arguments and
reasons.
B. Planned Parenthood v. Casey
The Court’s failure to provide publicly accessible reasons for its resolution of
the abortion issue continued in the Court’s 1992 decision in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey.68 In Casey, the Court responded to the legitimacy critique of Roe with an
explicit embrace of an evolving constitution not limited by the text, history, or
structure of the document, and with the doctrine of stare decisis.69 Both of these
approaches were about the Court and its power, rather than about the abortion issue
itself. In neither case did the Court truly defend, substantively, the balance it had
struck between abortion rights and the rights of (or state interests in) prenatal life.
In Casey, the Joint Opinion of Justices Kennedy, O’Connor, and Souter at
every point represents a majority of Justices and hence speaks for the Court. To the
degree the Joint Opinion reaffirmed Roe, or invalidated abortion restrictions, the
opinion is supported by Justices Blackmun and Stevens, and hence is the opinion
of the Court.70 To the degree the Joint Opinion overruled Roe’s trimester
framework, applied an undue burden standard to limit the application of strict
scrutiny, and upheld statutory restrictions on abortion, the holdings are implicitly
supported by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia, White and Thomas.
Indeed, this group of four Justices would have gone much farther than the Joint
Opinion by overruling Roe v. Wade’s holding that abortion is a fundamental right,
and thereby would have allowed states to prohibit previability abortions,
presumably with exceptions for life of the mother and likely other specified
circumstances.71
The Joint Opinion’s explicit embrace of evolving constitutionalism, and
rejection of historically-bounded originalism, was eloquent, even poetic, in arguing
for evolving constitutionalism as a basis for a fundamental abortion liberty.72 While
the Joint Opinion’s discourse on women and abortion was distorted from a pro-life
perspective, which will be addressed below, what is most striking is the Joint
Opinion’s continuing failure to apply evolving constitutionalism to the rights of the

68. Casey, 505 U.S. 833. The three-Justice Joint Opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey in all of
its parts constitutes the binding rules and precedent of the case, under standard rules of constitutional
construction.
69. Casey, 505 U.S. at 845–46. For a fuller critique of the Court’s stare decisis discussion, see
Linton, supra note 20.
70. Casey, 505 U.S. at 912, 922; ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 846–47 (4th
ed. 2011); Stephen G. Gilles, Why the Right to Elective Abortion Fails Casey’s Own Interest-Balancing
Methodology—And Why It Matters, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 691, 696 n.26 (2015).
71. Casey, 505 U.S. at 944; CHEMERINSKY, supra note 70, at 847–48; Gilles, supra note 70, at 696
n.26.
72. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846–53.
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unborn.73 Thus, the Joint Opinion justified the abortion liberty in terms of the
“right to define one’s own concept of existence,”74 but ignored the unborn child’s
very right to exist. From a pro-life perspective, the Joint Opinion pondering the
“mystery of human life”75 is an odd juxtaposition to an abortion right often
effectuated by tearing apart the living body of a fetus.76 For the fetus, perhaps the
Joint Opinion could have reflected instead on the mystery of death? The Joint
Opinion is tone-deaf; its intentionally-elevated rhetoric on the abortion right
demonstrates that it never truly considers the impact of abortion on the unborn
child.
The Joint Opinion repeated Roe’s failure to explain its one-sided application of
evolving constitutionalism only to the abortion right, and not to prenatal life. Hence,
while there are many pages justifying evolving constitutionalism and its application
to the abortion liberty, there is not a single word on the possibility of applying this
vaunted evolving constitutionalism to prenatal life. If evolving constitutionalism is
the correct method of constitutional interpretation, why not apply it fully to the
abortion issue, including to the rights of the unborn? Indeed, prenatal life is barely
mentioned, occupying only a few lines.77 As a quantitative matter, there are six and
one-half pages devoted to justifying the abortion liberty,78 comprising well over 200
lines of text, and perhaps five lines of text analyzing the opposing consideration of
prenatal life.79 On a quantitative basis, the abortion liberty gets perhaps 98% of the
Joint Opinion’s attention, that of prenatal life perhaps 2%, and the possibility of
unborn life having constitutional rights, 0%.
The Joint Opinion followed Roe’s line of reducing discussion of prenatal life
to a very brief mention of the “State interest” involved,80 as though abortion is
simply a matter of personal liberty versus the oppressive hand of the law, rather
than a potential conflict of one human being’s liberty against another human being’s
right to exist. The Joint Opinion whitewashed the death of the unborn under the
antiseptic language of “terminating a pregnancy,”81 thus allowing itself and the
reader to pass quickly over the obvious point that when a “pregnancy is terminated”
a life is also ended. Certainly, there is nothing in the Joint Opinion to give the
impression that the Court was considering, even for a moment, the possible
application of evolving constitutionalism to the rights of the unborn. The unborn
are the hidden ghosts, the elephant in the room, the skeleton in the Court’s closet,

73. Id.
74. Id. at 851.
75. Id.
76. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 925 (2000) (describing “the potential need for
instrumental disarticulation or dismemberment of the fetus or the collapse of fetal parts to facilitate
evacuation from the uterus”); see generally WARREN M. HERN, ABORTION PRACTICE (1990).
77. Casey, 505 U.S. at 852–53.
78. Id. at 846–53.
79. Id. at 852–53.
80. Id. at 853.
81. Id. at 850, 853.
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the virtually unmentionable. It is as though the Court wants to justify its abortion
decisions while giving only a glancing consideration of what abortion is and does.
This is hardly a giving of “reasons.”
Among its brief mentions of prenatal life, the Joint Opinion does speak of
consequences “depending on one’s beliefs, for the life or potential life that is
aborted.”82 This language of “beliefs” and “potential life” repeats Roe’s fundamental
confusion about the science of prenatal life.83 While the philosophical and legal
“personhood” of the fetus is debatable, the fetus is every much as “alive” as anyone
reading this page, and the status of the individual fetus as dead or alive is
ascertainable as a medical fact.84 The Court again confuses philosophical and
religious debate over “personhood” which is a matter of “belief,” with the scientific
certainties. This confusion matters, for it allows the Court to pretend that whether
abortion takes a human life is a matter of “belief” rather than scientific fact.85
The Joint Opinion’s failure to consider rights and interests related to prenatal
life, however, is not merely implicit. The Joint Opinion explicitly and specifically
refused to defend the balance dictated in Roe between the abortion liberty and the
life of the unborn.86 The Joint Opinion stated that the balance “was a subject of
debate both in Roe itself and in decisions following it,” and that “the reservations
any of us may have in reaffirming the central holding of Roe are outweighed by the
explication of individual liberty we have given combined with the force of stare
decisis.”87 Thus, the Joint Opinion declined to even assert that the balance struck in
Roe was correct, apart from stare decisis, let alone defend it with reasons.
The Joint Opinion’s long discussion of stare decisis repeated this specific
refusal to substantively defend Roe’s respective weighing of the abortion liberty and
prenatal life. Hence, the Court stated:
On the other side of the equation is the interest of the State in the
protection of potential life. The Roe Court recognized the State’s
‘important and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of human
life.’. . . . The weight to be given this state interest, not the strength of the
woman’s interest, was the difficult question faced in Roe. We do not need
to say whether each of us, had we been Members of the Court when the
valuation of the state interests came before it as an original matter, would
have concluded, as the Roe Court did, that its weight is insufficient to justify
a ban on abortions prior to viability even when it is subject to certain
exceptions. The matter is not before us in the first instance, and coming
as it does after nearly 20 years of litigation in Roe’s wake we are satisfied

82. Id. at 852.
83. Id.
84. See AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS, supra note 38; MOORE ET AL., supra note 38; MOORE, supra
note 39; see also supra text accompanying notes 38–39.
85. See sources cited supra note 84.
86. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846–53; Gilles, supra note 70, at 692–95, 717–20.
87. Casey, 505 U.S. at 853.
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that the immediate question is not the soundness of Roe’s resolution of the
issue, but the precedential force that must be accorded to its holding.88
One point must be emphasized: the Joint Opinion determined that the
“soundness of Roe’s resolution of the issue” was not relevant to their decision.89
Hence, the Casey Court substantively refused to even attempt to defend the core of
Roe, its resolution of the conflict between the abortion liberty, and prenatal life.
Further, even as the Court refused to defend Roe, the Court repeated Roe’s flawed
and unscientific language of “the potentiality of human life.”90
The Court’s approach to justifying its abortion holdings is like a shell game
where the justifications are always to be found somewhere else and remain ever
hidden. Despite the length of the Court’s opinion in Roe v. Wade, the Court failed to
provide reasons for the most important parts of its decision, including the viability
line, and its failure to consider the rights of the unborn in the light of evolving
constitutionalism and new developments in scientific knowledge about prenatal life.
Indeed, the known scientific facts about embryonic and fetal development are never
mentioned in Roe, and thus are treated as irrelevant. Casey repeats these same failures
as to viability and the rights and status of the unborn by essentially passing over
these issues without cogent explanation. Casey goes further, however, by explicitly
refusing to examine, let alone defend, the correctness of Roe as a matter of
constitutional law and interpretation. Casey hence looks back to Roe to justify
holdings that Roe itself never actually justified, in terms of providing reasons. Since
Roe and Casey are the primary, and really only, moments in the Court’s many
abortion cases and numerous decisions, when it either creates or reevaluates its core
abortion holdings, the result is that the Court has never provided reasons for the
balance it has struck between the abortion liberty and prenatal life. It is not merely
that the Court’s reasoning is weak, but rather that the Court fails and refuses to
provide reasons at all. Hence, Roe and Casey are acts of power lacking in reason. The
Court’s opinions are about the Court’s power, and it is that power, rather than the
Court’s substantive abortion holdings, that the Court defends.
The Casey Court’s long discussion of stare decisis continues this emphasis, in
the Court’s abortion decisions, on justifying the Court’s power rather than the
Court’s decisions. The Joint Opinion refuses to say whether Roe is right, but argues
that reaffirming even an erroneous decision on a highly contentious issue is better
for the nation than overruling it in the midst of public controversy.91 The Joint
Opinion thus argues that democratic activism against a decision of the Supreme
Court is a reason for the Court to reaffirm that decision regardless of its correctness
as a matter of constitutional interpretation.92 Instead of showing respect for public

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 871.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 864–69.
Id.
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and democratic activism on an issue of public concern, the Court treats such
activism as an affront to the Court and even to the rule of law.
The Joint Opinion seems obsessed with opposition to Roe, noting it
repeatedly.93 Indeed, the Court is obsessed with its own inability to stop that
opposition, characterizing Roe as a case where the Court “calls the contending sides
of a national controversy to end their national division by accepting a common
mandate rooted in the Constitution.”94 Yet the Court is frustrated by the fact that
[abortions’] “divisiveness is no less today than in 1973, and pressure to overrule the
decision, like pressure to retain it, has grown only more intense.”95
Here, the Court gets its history entirely wrong. However controversial
abortion was in the late 1960s and early 1970s, its grip on the national consciousness
was minor compared to the major issues of the day, including the Vietnam War,
and racial, economic, and environmental issues.96 Abortion itself was only one part
of a broader subset of the larger issues related to the sexual revolution and the
women’s movement, and from the vantage point of that time not the most
important.97 Religious groups like the Southern Baptist Convention that would later
become bastions of a strict anti-abortion position were trying to position themselves
as presenting a compromise position regarding what they viewed as “difficult
decisions about abortion.”98 Indeed, some argue that Southern Baptists generally
were “pro-choice” at the time of Roe.99 Views on abortion were typically not a high
priority in evaluating candidates for the Supreme Court. Democratic candidate
George McGovern was lambasted by anti-abortion Democrats as the candidate of
“acid, amnesty and abortion,”100 even though he viewed abortion as an issue best
93. Id. at 853, 860, 861, 867, 869.
94. Id. at 867.
95. Id. at 869.
96. See Jennifer Rosenberg, Vietnam, Watergate, Iran and the 1970s, THOUGHTCO. (May
7, 2018), https://www.thoughtco.com/1970s-timeline-1779954 [https://web.archive.org/web/
20180608172554/https://www.thoughtco.com/1970s-timeline-1779954]; The Sixties: Moments
in Time, PBS SOCAL, http://www.pbs.org/opb/thesixties/timeline/timeline_text.html
[https://perma.cc/R83F-DEV3] (last visited July 10, 2018).
97. See JEFFREY ESCOFFIER, GLBTQ, THE SEXUAL REVOLUTION, 1960-1980 (2004),
http://www.glbtqarchive.com/ssh/sexual_revolution_S.pdf [https://perma.cc/SXV4-K8C8]; The
1960s-70s American Feminist Movement: Breaking Down Barriers for Women, TAVAANA,
https://tavaana.org/en/content/1960s-70s-american-feminist-movement-breaking-down-barrierswomen [https://perma.cc/FP92-YKEK] (last visited July 10, 2018) (“The feminist movement of the
1960s and ‘70s originally focused on dismantling workplace inequality, such as denial of access to better
jobs and salary inequality, via anti-discrimination laws.”).
98. Southern Baptist Convention Resolutions on Abortion, JOHNSTON’S ARCHIVE (Nov. 7, 2010),
http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/baptist/sbcabres.html [https://perma.cc/Q9VQ-LEVU].
99. See Joshua Holland, When Southern Baptists Were Pro-Choice, MOYERS ( July
17, 2014), http://billmoyers.com/2014/07/17/when-southern-baptists-were-pro-choice/
[https://web.archive.org/web/20180608173756/http://billmoyers.com/2014/07/17/whensouthern-baptists-were-pro-choice/]; Resolutions Search, S. BAPTIST CONVENTION, http://www.sbc.net/
resolutions/year/1971 (Resolutions Search “1971”).
100. See Timothy Noah, “Acid, Amnesty, and Abortion”: The Unlikely Source of a Legendary
Smear, NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 21, 2012), https://newrepublic.com/article/108977/acid-amnestyand-abortion-unlikely-source-legendary-smear
[https://web.archive.org/web/20140813035636/
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left to the states, while Richard Nixon positioned himself as personally pro-life but
instructed the federal government to defer to the States, even when the States
legalized abortion.101 States were coming to diverse conclusions as they engaged the
issue legislatively and democratically, and the overall trend of the law was toward
“liberalization of abortion statutes,” as noted in Roe.102 Abortion had not yet settled
fully into the left v. right, Democratic v. Republican, identity politics of our day, and
hence there was room for fluidity on the issue in the culture. The truth is that Roe,
rather than helping end a national division on abortion, radically increased divisions
on abortion, and helped nationalize what had been primarily a state law issue.103
It is surprising that the Joint Opinion would have such a distorted historical
understanding of Roe, when the contrary historical understanding has been well
described by one of the Court’s strongest advocates of abortion rights, Justice
Ginsburg. Hence, Justice Ginsburg famously opined that:
Roe ventured too far in the change it ordered. The sweep and detail of
the opinion stimulated the mobilization of a right-to-life movement and an
attendant reaction in Congress and state legislatures. In place of the trend
“toward liberalization of abortion statutes” noted in Roe, legislatures
adopted measures aimed at minimizing the impact of the 1973
rulings . . . .104
The Court’s distorted historical understanding is matched by the Court’s
distorted understanding of its relationship to the people, country, and Constitution.
From the Court’s point of view, to admit error in Roe, “if error there was,” would
undermine the very legitimacy of the country.105 The Court’s first premise in this
strange argument is that correcting error would undermine the Court’s legitimacy,
while refusing to overrule an erroneous ruling on a major constitutional issue would
uphold the Court’s legitimacy.106 The Court’s second premise is that reconsidering
and overruling a controversial decision amidst continued opposition would
undermine legitimacy, rather than be seen as a sign of appropriate
reconsideration.107 The Court’s third premise is that an undermining of the Court’s
legitimacy would similarly undermine the country’s legitimacy, the rule of law, and

https://newrepublic.com/article/108977/acid-amnesty-and-abortion-unlikely-source-legendarysmear]; Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley, Richard Nixon: Statement About Policy on Abortions at
Military Base Hospitals in the United States, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Apr. 3, 1971),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2963 [https://perma.cc/4KNK-BP3N].
101. Peters & Woolley, supra note 100.
102. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 139–40 (1973).
103. Id.
104. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Essay, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe
v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 381 (1985) (footnote number omitted).
105. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869 (1992).
106. Id. at 866–68.
107. Id.
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the self-confidence of the American people.108 Hence, the belief of the people in
themselves as:
[A] Nation of people who aspire to live according to the rule of
law . . . . is not readily separable from their understanding of the Court
invested with the authority to decide their constitutional cases and speak
before all others for their constitutional ideals. If the Court’s legitimacy
should be undermined, then, so would the country . . . . The Court’s
concern with legitimacy is not for the sake of the Court, but for the sake
of the Nation to which it is responsible.109
Thus, reversing an erroneous decision and correcting it would undermine the rule
of law and the very legitimacy of the nation.110
The Court’s rhetoric is that of any sovereign who claims they must cling to
power and not admit a mistake “for the sake of the people” rather than themselves,
and is just as believable. There are echoes here of Sophocles’ King Creon, who
refused to reconsider his cruel decree lest it show weakness and bring the law and
state into disrepute, producing anarchy.111 One would hope the Justices do not
believe their own rhetoric, but suspects that their self-delusion does rise to that level.
Somehow, the Justices persuaded themselves that for the Court to overrule Roe,
even if Roe was wrongly decided, would undermine the very legitimacy of the nation.
The Court’s rhetoric turns to the bizarre when it portrays Americans as being
“tested by following” the Supreme Court.112 These brave patriots who “follow” the
Supreme Court do so by bravely refusing to “force” the “reversal” of the Court’s
decisions.113 Of course there is no way to actually “force” the reversal of a Supreme
Court decision, but the language is a clue as to the Court’s distorted thinking.
Another clue is the Court’s implicit comparison of opposition to Brown I114 to
opposition to Roe.115 After Brown I & Brown II,116 governmental officials flagrantly
refused to implement the Court’s desegregation ruling for nearly a generation.117
Fifteen years after Brown, the vast majority of African-American children in the
South were still attending fully segregated schools, and in some states not a single
African-American child was attending a publicly integrated school.118 The
108. Id.
109. Id. at 868.
110. Id.
111. See Sophocles, Antigone, in CLASSICAL TRAGEDY GREEK & ROMAN 253, 266–80 (Robert
W. Corrigan ed., Dudley Fitts & Robert Fitzgerald trans., 1990).
112. Casey, 505 U.S. at 868.
113. Id. at 867.
114. Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
115. Casey, 505 U.S. at 867.
116. Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
117. See Brown v. Board at Fifty: “With an Even Hand”: The Aftermath, LIBR. CONGRESS,
http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/brown/brown-aftermath.html#obj182 [https://perma.cc/PB2C-TPNR]
(last visited July 10, 2018).
118. Walter Goodman, Brown v. Board of Education: Uneven Results 30 Years Later,
N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1984, http://www.nytimes.com/1984/05/17/us/brown-v-board-of-educationuneven-results-30-years-later.html?pagewanted=all.
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opposition to Brown occurred through government officials directly disobeying the
Court’s decision.119 As to abortion, however, there is nothing comparable. Roe
instantly and successfully legalized elective abortion throughout the United
States.120 The Court’s order was obeyed by government officials everywhere.121
There have been tens of millions of legal abortions performed in the United States
since Roe v. Wade.122 The Casey Court has fundamentally confused the normal and
appropriate uses of democratic channels and freedom of speech with disobeying a
court order and precedent.
For the Court to consider that it has a right to command the people to accept a
constitutional decision, in the sense of giving up all efforts to use democratic and
lawful channels to overrule and limit it, is a profound misunderstanding of Marbury
v. Madison123 and of the role of the Court in a democracy. The Court cannot
command the minds of the people as to the meaning of the Constitution for we are
not a totalitarian society. The Court has a constitutional obligation to be able to
perceive the difference between legitimate and longstanding disagreement with the
Court’s precedents, and disobedience of a precedent. Without such a distinction
democracy falls and the principle of judicial review is pushed to the breaking point.
At the point at which the Court perceives lawful and democratic opposition to its
decisions as a reason not to reconsider or overrule even an erroneous decision, the
Court has moved far beyond its mandate. The Court has moved from being the
servant of the Constitution and the people, to attempting to make the people the
servant of the Court.
The Court’s explicit statements demonstrate clearly that it did not truly
reconsider the correctness of Roe in Casey, but instead relied on a distorted
understanding of stare decisis to avoid truly reconsidering the decision on its
constitutional merits. Roe and Casey are acts of raw judicial power, but they do not
provide reasons for the most important rules the Court imposes on the country.
Indeed, Roe and Casey adapt the old adage of “my country right or wrong” to “my
Court right or wrong.” For those who still seek to use reason to discern what is
“right” about the Constitution and abortion, neither Roe nor Casey can supply
answers.
Indeed, the most obvious reading of Casey is that the majority viewed Roe to
be substantively incorrect, as a matter of constitutional interpretation. Four Justices

119. Brown at 60: The Southern Manifesto and “Massive Resistance” to Brown, NAACP
LDF, http://www.naacpldf.org/brown-at-60-southern-manifesto-and-massive-resistance-brown
[https://perma.cc/UJ22-FENR] (last visited July 10, 2018).
120. See Sarah Kliff, CHARTS: How Roe v. Wade Changed Abortion Rights, WASH. POST,
Jan. 22, 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/01/22/charts-how-roe-vwade-changed-abortion-rights/?utm_term=.abea8781401b.
121. See id.
122. Susan B. Hansen, State Implementation of Supreme Court Decisions: Abortion Rates Since
Roe v. Wade, 42 J. POL. 372 (1980).
123. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
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directly stated that Roe should be overruled.124 As one of them, Chief Justice
Rehnquist, noted, the Joint Opinion “cannot bring itself to say that Roe was correct
as an original matter . . . .”125 Presumably, if all three Justices of the Joint Opinion
believed Roe was correctly decided, they would have said so, and not felt the need
to hide behind stare decisis. The Joint Opinion rather coyly states that “[w]e do not
need to say whether each of us . . . would have concluded, as the Roe Court did,”
that bans on abortion prior to viability, even when “subject to certain exceptions”
are unconstitutional.126 Why include such a sentence if it does not signal the
substantive constitutional views of at least one of the authors? Hence, the logical
conclusion is that somewhere between five and seven Justices believed Roe was
incorrect “as an original matter,” with only two Justices, including the author of Roe,
willing to assert Roe’s substantive correctness.127 Upon examination, then, Casey is
an exercise in reaffirming a prior decision that the majority most probably believe
to be, as an original matter, erroneous; the ultimate basis of that reaffirmation is not
that the decision is correct but rather that the Court must defend its institutional
integrity and reputation by not admitting its mistakes.
II. WOMEN’S RIGHTS AND GENDER EQUALITY
The conventional narrative views abortion rights as fundamental to women’s
rights and gender equality. This narrative is so well-known that it needs little
elaboration. The abortion liberty is seen as fundamental to women’s autonomy in
allowing them control over their lives, bodies, sexuality, and reproductive functions.
This autonomy is perceived as necessary to allow women to compete equally with
men in the spheres of employment, education, politics, and civic life, and to free
women from patriarchal control. Given the burdens of stereotyped gender
expectations related to maternity and pregnancy, women’s equality requires the
abortion liberty.128
Upon examination, the abortion rights movement is based on presuppositions
that imply the inferiority of women. The abortion rights movement distrusts women
profoundly, both individually and as a group. Further, the abortion liberty in the
context of contemporary American society may hurt women more than it helps

124. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 944 (1992).
125. Id. at 953.
126. Id. at 871.
127. See Gilles, supra note 70, at 717–20.
128. See, e.g., WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra note 5; Ginsburg, supra note
104; Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court 1976 Term Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 53–59 (1977); Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical
Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261 (1992); Katha
Pollitt, Can a Feminist Be Pro-Life?, NATION (Mar. 10, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/cana-feminist-be-pro-life/ [https://perma.cc/P4JB-TNZX]. For further citations, see Erika Bachiochi,
Embodied Equality: Debunking Equal Protection Arguments for Abortion Rights, 34 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 889, 891 n.3 (2011).
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them, as it is based on a misunderstanding of the primary obstacles to equality and
flourishing for women in contemporary America.129
A. Roe and Women’s Rights
It is generally recognized that Roe v. Wade was not written as a women’s rights
or gender equality opinion.130 Indeed, the Court’s summary statement focused on
how the Court’s holdings vindicate the physician’s, rather than the woman’s, control
over abortion:
The decision vindicates the right of the physician to administer
medical treatment according to his professional judgment up to the points
where important state interests provide compelling justifications for
intervention. Up to those points the abortion decision in all its aspects is
inherently and primarily, a medical decision, and basic responsibility for it
must rest with the physician.131
Indeed, the Court strangely states as well, in summary of its rule creating
elective abortion until viability: “This means, on the other hand, that, for the period
of pregnancy prior to this ‘compelling’ point, the attending physician, in
consultation with his patient, is free to determine, without regulation by the State,
that, in his medical judgment, the patient’s pregnancy should be terminated.”132
The Court’s language seems strangely backwards, as it sounds literally as
though the abortion decision belongs to the physician in consultation with the
woman, rather than belonging to the woman in consultation with her doctor. The
reference that the pregnancy “should be terminated” in the doctor’s “medical
judgment”133 is very strange in a context where the vast majority of abortions will
not have any medical need or indication.134
Justice Ginsburg aptly commented that in Roe, “the view you get is the tall
doctor and the little woman who needs him.”135 Professor Petchesky, another
feminist abortion rights advocate and the sole author cited by the Casey Joint

129. See, e.g., Bachiochi, supra note 128; Sidney Callahan, Abortion & the Sexual Agenda, in 62
REFERENCE SHELF 34, 44 ( Janet Podell ed., 1990); Erika Bachiochi, A Putative Right in Search of a
Constitutional Justification: Understanding Planned Parenthood v. Casey’s Equality Rationale and How it
Undermines Women’s Equality, 35 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 593 (2017).
130. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 70, at 844; Ginsburg, supra note 104, at 382–83.
131. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165–66.
132. Id. at 163.
133. Id.
134. GUTTMACHER INST., FACT SHEET: INDUCED ABORTION IN THE UNITED
STATES (2018), https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/factsheet/fb_induced_abortion.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GEH3-WMTU]; Lawrence B. Finer et al., Reasons U.S. Women Have Abortions:
Quantitative and Qualitative Perspectives, 37 PERSP. SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 110 (2005).
135. Robert Barnes, The Forgotten History of Justice Ginsburg’s Criticism of Roe v. Wade,
WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/theforgotten-history-of-justice-ginsburgs-criticism-of-roe-v-wade/2016/03/01/9ba0ea2e-dfe8-11e5-9c36e1902f6b6571_story.html?utm_term=.689c643c6def.
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Opinion in regard to gender equality and abortion,136 is in accord: “Of course the
actual formulation of Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton did not stress the woman’s right
or capacity to choose so much as the physician’s; they were decisions that relied on
and bolstered medical authority.”137
As a matter of constitutional doctrine, the Roe Court’s reference to “the right
of the physician to administer medical treatment according to his professional
judgment”138 is clearly erroneous. Since the Court’s rejection of economic
substantive due process rights in 1937, there has been no such thing as a
fundamental right to practice a profession, job, or vocation at all, let alone a
fundamental right to practice in a manner contrary to the dictates of governmental
regulation.139 The one exception would be in the context of the Comity Clause, but
the Clause is only relevant if there is discrimination as to state or local residence.140
Physicians are only permitted to bring challenges to abortion statutes by virtue of
third-party standing, which allows the physician to rely on the woman’s abortion
right, since the physician has no right of his or her own to assert.141 Justice
Blackmun is thus clearly in error to summarize his decision as vindicating physician
rights to practice medicine free of governmental control, for such right does not
exist.142
Nonetheless, this error indicates that Justice Ginsburg and Professor
Petchesky are correct about Roe and physicians: in the mind of the author, Justice
Blackmun, and apparently the entire Court, the opinion is really about the freedom
of doctors rather than the freedom of women. This is also underscored by the one
regulation of abortion which the Roe opinion explicitly permits in the first trimester,
which is the requirement that abortions be performed only by physicians.143 Hence,
Roe frees women from the control of the State as to abortion, only to hand her over
to what was in 1973 an overwhelmingly male-dominated medical profession.144

136. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992) (citing ROSALIND
P. PETCHESKY, ABORTION AND WOMAN’S CHOICE: THE STATE, SEXUALITY, AND REPRODUCTIVE
FREEDOM 109, 133 n.7 (2d. ed. 1990)).
137. PETCHESKY, supra note 136, at 309.
138. Roe, 410 U.S. at 165.
139. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Wayne McCormack, The
Economic Substantive Due Process and the Right of Livelihood, 82 KY. L.J. 397 (1993); Note, State Views
on Economic Due Process: 1937-1953, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 827 (1953).
140. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1; Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due
Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 408 (2010).
141. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976); Henry P. Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84
COLUM. L. REV. 277, 306–11 (1984).
142. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 939 (1992).
143. Roe, 410 U.S. at 165.
144. See ANN K. BOULIS & JERRY A. JACOBS, THE CHANGING FACE OF MEDICINE: WOMEN
DOCTORS AND THE EVOLUTION OF HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA (2008); Eliza L. Chin, Historical
Perspective, in THIS SIDE OF DOCTORING: REFLECTIONS FROM WOMEN IN MEDICINE 1 (Eliza
L. Chin ed., 2002); Aaron Young et al., A Census of Actively Licensed Physicians in the United States,
101 J. MED. REG. 8 (2014).
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Justice Ginsburg’s statement that the Roe Court envisions “the little woman”
who needs the “tall doctor” further suggests that Roe itself is based on a demeaning
view of women.145 Rhetorically and practically, it seems that the Roe Court did not
really trust women with the abortion right, and hence felt the need to place women
under the control of a male-dominated medical profession.146 While a charitable
view of the Roe Court would state that the Court placed women in the hands of the
medical profession to protect the safety of women, given the Court’s erroneous
rhetoric about physician’s rights, this charitable view is not a complete explanation.
How do you explain the Court preferring to summarize the abortion right in terms
of a nonexistent physician’s right, rather than in terms of the women’s right the
Court had just established? In addition, the Roe Court stressed the safety of abortion,
stating that it was much safer in the first trimester than continuing the pregnancy
and proceeding to childbirth.147 If abortion is so safe, could it not perhaps be
performed by other competent medical personnel, besides doctors, and hence made
more accessible? Roe rhetorically and practically subjects women to the control of
physicians’ judgment, even as to nonmedical aspects of the abortion decision,
suggesting that more than safety is at issue in the Court’s focus on physicians’ rights
and lack of focus on women’s rights.
B. Casey and Equality
The Court in Casey would have certainly been well aware of the critique of Roe
as insufficiently attentive to gender equality concerns, particularly given that the
critique had been publicly voiced by a member of the Court.148 While the Court did
not attempt to supplement the Roe Court’s substantive due process analysis with
formal analysis under the equal protection clause, the Joint Opinion did discuss
equality in the section on stare decisis.149 There, in discussing the reliance interest
of Roe as a precedent, the Joint Opinion stated: “The ability of women to participate
equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their
ability to control their reproductive lives.”150
Abortion rights proponents seem not to have noticed the problematic nature
of such a claim, and in particular how its presuppositions imply the inferiority of
women. First, one needs to ask: why do women need abortion to be “equal” to
men? The obvious answer is that men don’t get pregnant, and therefore an abortion
is the closest a woman can come to being like a man. Abortion liberty allows a
woman seemingly to escape what a man automatically escapes, the risk of becoming
pregnant, through the liberty to end that pregnancy at will. But isn’t basing women’s
equality on needing to be like—or as nearly like as possible––a man, itself a
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

See Ginsburg, supra note 104.
See Casey, 505 U.S. at 953.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 145–46.
See Ginsburg, supra note 104.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 862.
Id. at 856.
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discriminatory premise?151 Are abortion rights advocates, including the Court in
Casey, not implicitly admitting that they believe male sexuality and being male is
superior to female sexuality and being female? Rex Harrison famously sang, in a
classic presentation of sexism: “Why can’t a woman be more like a man?”152 It seems
that the abortion rights movement is singing off the same song sheet.153
It is interesting how few struggle, in American culture, with the inability of
men to become pregnant and bear children, and how that might mark men as
inferior or disadvantaged. By contrast, the concern that women’s capacity to
become pregnant might disadvantage women is foundational to abortion rights
literature and rhetoric.154 It would seem that this foundational prejudice and sexism
in our culture has been absorbed as a presupposition by the abortion rights
movement.155 Hence, pro-life feminist Sidney Callahan notes:
While Margaret Mead stressed the ‘womb envy’ of males in other
societies, it has been more or less repressed in our own. In our maledominated world, what men don’t do, doesn’t count. Pregnancy,
childbirth, and nursing have been characterized as passive, debilitating,
animal-like. The disease model of pregnancy and birth has been
entrenched. This female disease or impairment, with its attendant “female
troubles,” naturally handicaps women in the ‘real’ world of hunting, war,
and the corporate fast track. Many . . . cite the ‘basic injustice that women
have to bear the babies,’ instead of seeing the injustice in the fact that men
cannot . . . ; unfortunately, many women have fallen for the phallic
fallacy.156
Practically speaking, moreover, the abortion liberty does nothing to help
women compete with men, unless women are willing to use it by actually
undergoing abortions. Women have to pay a price to be “nearly like” a man: they
have to choose and undergo an abortion. Men, of course, do not have to pay such
a price to avoid pregnancy. Hence, if women need abortion to be equal to men, they
will never be equal, because they have to pay a higher price for this equality than the
man: actually choosing and undergoing abortion.
A part of this higher price that women must pay for equality is, in significant
part, the willingness to choose an act which many, perhaps most, women view as

151. See Callahan, supra note 129.
152. See, e.g., A Hymn to Him Lyrics, ST LYRICS, https://www.stlyrics.com/lyrics/myfairlady/
ahymntohim.htm [https://perma.cc/Q7JN-DBMT] (last visited July 10, 2018); cf. Geoffrey
P. Hunt, Why Can’t a Woman Be More Like a Man, AM. THINKER (Mar. 25,
2012), http://www.americanthinker.com/articles/2012/03/why_cant_a_women_be_more_like_a_
man.html [https://perma.cc/8RR5-9355].
153. See Bachiochi, supra note 129, at 633-34.
154. See Jennifer S. Hendricks, Body and Soul: Equality, Pregnancy, and the Unitary Right to
Abortion, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 329 (2010); Donald P. Judges, Taking Care Seriously: Relational
Feminism, Sexual Difference, and Abortion, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1323 (1995).
155. See Callahan, supra note 129.
156. Id.
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causing the death of her offspring.157 Here is where the abortion rights movement
runs into one of its fundamental problems: women who have various degrees of
anti-abortion views.
If such women were rare, the problem would be difficult enough. However,
to the contrary, polling over several decades has shown little gender gap on
abortion. For example, “Gallup’s abortion polling since the mid-1970s finds few
remarkable distinctions between men’s and women’s views on the legality of
abortion.”158 The polling by Pew similarly reveals “[n]o gender gap in views on
whether abortion should be legal.”159 Interestingly, polling in the U.K. finds women
to be more anti-abortion than men.160 Behind this polling on the legality of abortion,
moreover, it appears that a majority of Americans believe that life either begins at
conception or by implantation, and hence by implication would believe that all
surgical abortions and most pharmaceutical abortions would end a human life.161
Abortion polling is notoriously subject to how the questions are worded,
leading both sides able to manipulate the questions and to some degree the
results.162 However, it is fairly clear that among both women and men there are
minorities who truly exemplify either the pro-life orthodoxy of prohibiting all
abortions (except those necessary to save the life of the mother), or the abortion
rights orthodoxy of supporting elective abortion through viability or later, as well as
supporting late term abortion methods such as intact D & X abortion (also known
as partial birth abortion). Most women and men are somewhere in the middle, with
their views of abortion dependent on the stage of pregnancy and the circumstances
of the woman.163 Most Americans when asked support Roe, but at the same time a
large majority of both women and men say they would support prohibiting abortion
after the first trimester, a position inconsistent with Roe.164 Polling varies on whether
157. Id. at 44.
158. Lydia Saad, Education Trumps Gender in Predicting Support for Abortion, GALLUP
(Apr. 28, 2010), http://news.gallup.com/poll/127559/education-trumps-gender-predicting-supportabortion.aspx [https://web.archive.org/web/20180709174325/https://news.gallup.com/poll/127559/
education-trumps-gender-predicting-support-abortion.aspx].
159. No Gender Gap in Views on Whether Abortion Should Be Legal, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 7,
2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/07/07/on-abortion-persistent-divides-betweenand-within-the-two-parties-2/ft_16-04-07_abortion_demographics/ [https://perma.cc/JD8N-WC7P].
160. Martin Robbins, Why Are Women More Opposed to Abortion?, GUARDIAN, Apr. 30,
2014, https://www.theguardian.com/science/the-lay-scientist/2014/apr/30/why-are-women-moreopposed-to-abortion [https://perma.cc/YW4Z-PAZY].
161. Newsweek Poll Shoes Majoriy of Americans Believe Life Begins at Conception, LIFESITE
NEWS ( June 2, 2003), https://www.lifesitenews.com/news/newsweek-poll-shows-majoriy-ofamericans-believe-life-begins-at-conception [https://perma.cc/45YM-9QVR].
162. See William Saletan, Do Most Americans Think Most Abortions Should Be Illegal?, SLATE
( Jan. 22, 2014), http://www.slate.com/blogs/saletan/2014/01/22/abortion_polls_2014_do_most_
americans_think_most_abortions_should_be_illegal.html [https://perma.cc/9XTE-FFJ6].
163. Lydia Saad, Americans’ Attitudes Toward Abortion Unchanged, GALLUP (May 25,
2016), http://news.gallup.com/poll/191834/americans-attitudes-toward-abortion-unchanged.aspx
[https://web.archive.org/web/20180122075228/http://news.gallup.com/poll/191834/americansattitudes-toward-abortion-unchanged.aspx].
164. See id.
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the pro-life or pro-choice label are more popular, but significant pluralities of
Americans of similar proportions embrace both labels.165 For example, in 2016
Gallup reports 47% of Americans identifying as pro-choice and 46% identifying as
pro-life.166 Since far more Americans embrace such labels than actually hold pure
pro-life or pure pro-choice viewpoints, the decision to accept such labels seems as
much a matter of identity as one’s actual position on abortion. Hence, there is a
surprising degree of overlap in views on a number of specific abortion issues among
those who accept the purportedly conflicting pro-life and pro-choice labels.167
The abortion rights mantra embraced by the Supreme Court in Casey—that
women need abortion rights to compete with men in American society—is
particularly problematic for the more than 40% of American women who identify
as pro-life.168 The message for pro-life women is that they must choose between
their conscience and equality. From this perspective, “equality” logically requires
pro-life women to violate their consciences and choose to abort an embryo or fetus
whom the woman regards as her unborn daughter or son. After all, if abortion is
what allows women to compete with men, the possibility of being able to abort does
no good unless one is willing to follow through and actually undergo an abortion
when a pregnancy occurs at the “wrong” time of life.
Indeed, abortion practitioners regularly perform abortions on women who
perceive abortion to be wrong, and even murder, at the time of the abortion.169 The
abortion rights movement explicitly or implicitly labels such women hypocrites, and
sometimes evidences a certain degree of contempt for them.170 Indeed, the
movement seems to assume that such women are representative generally of prolife women, as though some degree of inconsistency or hypocrisy was the unique
preserve of pro-life women.171
However, perhaps the deeper problem is that the success of the abortion rights
movement has created a situation where some pro-life women have embraced the
sexist presumption that a woman must choose between her equality and future life
on one hand, and her conscience and the life of her unborn child on the other hand.

165. See id.
166. Id.
167. Lydia Saad, Plenty of Common Ground Found in Abortion Debate, GALLUP (Aug. 8, 2011),
http://news.gallup.com/poll/148880/Plenty-Common-Ground-Found-Abortion-Debate.aspx?g_
source=abortion&g_medium=search&g_campaign=tiles; Lydia Saad, U.S. Abortion Attitudes Stable;
No Consensus on Legality, GALLUP ( June 9, 2017), http://news.gallup.com/poll/211901/
abortion-attitudes-stable-no-consensus-legality.aspx [https://web.archive.org/web/20180612235547/
http://news.gallup.com/poll/211901/abortion-attitudes-stable-no-consensus-legality.aspx].
168. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa.v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992).
169. Joyce Arthur, The Only Moral Abortion Is My Abortion: When Anti-Choice Choose,
PRO-CHOICE ACTION NETWORK (Sept. 2000), http://www.prochoiceactionnetwork-canada.org/
articles/anti-tales.shtml [https://perma.cc/TLZ4-ER42].
170. Id.
171. See Arthur, supra note 169; Joyce Arthur, Personhood: Is a Fetus a Human Being?, PROCHOICE ACTION NETWORK (Aug. 2001), http://www.prochoiceactionnetwork-canada.org/articles/
fetusperson.shtml [https://perma.cc/2WHD-NG36].
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This set of presumptions puts pro-life women in a box under which they lose
regardless of which choice they make.
Pro-life feminist Sidney Callahan put the matter quite well decades ago:
Pitting women against their own offspring is not only morally
offensive, it is psychologically and politically destructive. Women will never
climb to equality and social empowerment over mounds of dead
fetuses . . . . As long as most women choose to bear children, they stand to
gain from the same constellation of attitudes and institutions that will also
protect the fetus in the woman’s womb—-and they stand to lose from the
cultural assumptions that support permissive abortion. Despite temporary
conflicts of interest, feminine and fetal liberation are ultimately one and
the same.172
C. The Abortion Liberty, Equality, and Personal Life
Beyond the issue of whether abortion rights help women attain equality and
success in regard to employment and careers, is the issue of how it impacts their
personal lives. Here, abortion rights feminist Petchesky, writing more than fifteen
years after Roe, expressed frustration with young women:
Even during the most liberal years of teenage access to abortion and
contraception, the potentially liberating impact of that access was muffled
by the persistence of a male-dominant culture and social relations of sex.
The openness and legitimacy of nonmarital heterosexual activity continued
to be encumbered with traditional risks and pain for young teenage
women, inasmuch as they played for different stakes (commitment, love,
romance) than males, and often lost. A clear feminist vision, an alternative
culture of sexuality embracing passion and play as well as love, has not
penetrated the consciousness of younger generations . . . .173
This is a very odd passage, and observes situations where young women have
different sexual and relational goals than young men.174 Petchesky seems profoundly
disappointed that these single young women, handed the liberations of abortion and
contraception, still yearn for “commitment, love, [and] romance . . . .”175 Petchesky
implicitly acknowledges that these liberations cannot help young women attain
“commitment, love, romance,” and she wants young women to change their
personal goals toward what might be termed a more liberated sexuality.176
It is revealing to see a feminist from an earlier generation criticize a younger
generation of women for wanting to attain stable, loving partnerships with men, as
though that goal represented some basic deficiency. The abortion liberty appears to
be a part of a broader agenda to redirect the personal sexual and reproductive goals
and practices of women. Rather than helping women achieve their sexual, relational,
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Callahan, supra note 129, at 44.
PETCHESKY, supra note 136, at 397.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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and reproductive goals, the abortion liberty may be designed to alter those goals.
The abortion liberty may be both the symptom and cause of an unraveling and
reshaping of the intricate relationships between women and men, women and
children, and men and children. That unraveling and reshaping may indeed make
committed long-term partnerships between women and men less available in
society, and thus can become a self-fulfilling prophecy. This reshaping of women’s
sexual and reproductive goals may be pursued in the name of furthering gender
equality and women’s rights, and freeing women from patriarchal control.
Nonetheless, the entire project appears misogynist, as it seeks to make women’s
sexuality in effect more like men’s, in the sense of being unburdened by the
possibility of pregnancy, and being modeled after the more unattractive forms of
male sexual practice.177
Thus, to the degree that the sexual and reproductive goals of young women
are focused on commitment, love, and romance, in the form of long-term
partnerships with men, the abortion liberty may hinder, and does not help, achieve
such goals. The abortion liberty is hence about changing women’s sexuality, rather
than meeting the sexual and reproductive goals of women. This point is further
underscored by the next topic, that of “abandoning women to their privacy.”
D. Abortion as a Privacy Right: Abandoning Women to Their Privacy
Both abortion rights feminists and pro-life feminists have noted the
difficulties created, for women, of defining the abortion right as a privacy right.
Hence, Petchesky states:
The claim for ‘abortion rights’ seeks access to a necessary service, but
by itself it fails to address the social relations and sexual divisions around
which responsibilities for pregnancy and children is assigned. In real-life
struggles, this limitation exacts a price, for it lets men and society neatly off
the hook.178
Similarly, Callahan writes:
Permissive abortion, granted in the name of women’s privacy and
reproductive freedom, ratifies the view that pregnancies and children are a
woman’s private individual responsibility. More and more frequently, we
hear some version of this old rationalization: if she refuses to get rid of it,
it’s her problem. A child becomes a product of the individual woman’s
freely chosen investment, a form of private property resulting from her
own cost-benefit calculation. The larger community is relieved of moral
responsibility.179

177. Callahan, supra note 129, at 46–51. To be clear, I am not asserting that all male sexual
practices are unattractive, and am not implying that male sexuality is inherently aberrant; rather, I assert
simply that some male sexual practices are unattractive or irresponsible.
178. PETCHESKY, supra note 136, at 7.
179. Callahan, supra note 129, at 45.
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Thus, the woman’s “choice” becomes a social obligation to abort so as to not
inconvenience others, with her capacity to demand co-responsibility with the father,
her family, and society undermined. The woman who refuses to abort in the face of
a complex or difficult situation can be abandoned to her privacy by those who no
longer feel any responsibility for the pregnancy or the resulting birth of any children.
Hence, the abortion right is turned against women and used by male sexual partners,
family members, and society at large to justify their failure to take joint responsibility
with the woman for pregnancy and childrearing. Petchesky sees this negative result
as perhaps caused by the contexts in which the abortion liberty is exercised,180 while
Callahan argues that the abortion liberty is itself partly responsible for undermining
the woman’s social situation.181
Either way, in the real-world situation in the United States, with its neo-liberal
economic system and privatized concepts of family life, the abortion liberty’s
promise of “choice” undermines many women’s capacity to insist on the conditions
that could empower her to give birth, keep her baby, and thrive. As Callahan notes,
the woman, instead of being empowered, faces “the debilitating reality of not
bringing a baby into the world; not being able to count on a committed male partner;
not accounting oneself strong enough, or the master of enough resources, to avoid
killing the fetus.”182
Hence, the Supreme Court’s doctrinal grounding of abortion in autonomy,
privacy, and liberty may ultimately undermine woman’s equality, particularly in the
context of American society. Ultimately, the realization of women’s equality,
particularly in the spheres of sexuality, reproduction and family life, requires more
than abandoning women to their “privacy,” but rather requires a context of coresponsibility. The abortion liberty becomes a self-fulfilling defeat for many
women: because many men, families, and communities are unreliable, women are
granted the abortion liberty. However, the reality and rhetoric of an abortion liberty
becomes an additional permission and validation of many men, families, and
communities to continue to be unreliable.183
Perhaps the abortion rights movement has miscalculated regarding the
fundamental obstacles many women face in achieving practical equality and
empowerment. The classic story of empowerment is liberation from overcontrol
and oppression––for women the need to be liberated from patriarchal control.
While problems of patriarchal control surely continue, perhaps the greater problem
for many young women in contemporary America is not overcontrol but
abandonment. The problem for many young women is not that fathers, boyfriends,
or husbands are controlling their lives and sexual and reproductive functions, but
rather that they lack stable families of origin or reliable and responsible life partners.
Worse, abandonment, exploitation, and patriarchal control may co-exist as sexual
180.
181.
182.
183.

PETCHESKY, supra note 136, at 7–8.
Callahan, supra note 129, at 45; see also Bachiochi, supra note 128, at 919–24.
Callahan, supra note 129, at 49.
See id.
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“liberation” reinforces male entitlement and impunity. The abortion right in some
contexts may facilitate forms of patriarchy that marry a purported ethic of sexual
liberation with continuing exploitation of women’s bodies. True liberation in postsexual revolution America may require the creation of contexts in which coresponsibility, mutual respect, and commitment can thrive. Otherwise, freedom in
modern America may be, as Janis Joplin put it long ago, “just another word for
nothing left to lose.”184
E. Democracy and Women in Contemporary America
Perhaps the most obvious way in which the abortion rights movement
distrusts women as a group is the demand to remove abortion as much as possible
from the democratic process. Roe v. Wade of course invalidated the democraticallycreated laws of all fifty states and the District of Columbia.185 As noted above, this
was done in the name of physician’s rights more than women’s rights, as a way of
shielding medical practice from majoritarian control in regard to abortion.186 If one
repudiates the physician’s rights rationale of abortion and tries to substitute the
women’s rights rationale, however, the decision to remove abortion from the
democratic sphere becomes problematic. Women, after all, comprise a majority of
voters in contemporary America.187 Thus, if one truly trusted women as a group, it
would seem natural to entrust the abortion decision to the democratic process.
Thus, Erika Bachiochi notes: “It is particularly ironic that a women’s movement
which began with the quest to ensure women political participation through the
franchise would favor, generations later, removing the privilege and power of
democratic participation from women through the Court’s sharp intervention in the
abortion debate.”188
Abortion rights proponents, however, must be painfully aware that even if
only women were allowed to vote on abortion, the result would not reflect the
positions of the abortion rights movement. As noted above, women’s views on
abortion are not markedly different from that of men, and over 40% of American

184. Janis Joplin, Me and Bobby McGee, GENIUS, https://genius.com/Janis-joplin-me-andbobby-mcgee-lyrics [https://perma.cc/9DW6-L47S] (last visited July 10, 2018).
185. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165 (1973); see also Merz et al., supra note 16, at 5; Rachael
K. Pirner & Laurie B. Williams, Roe to Casey: A Survey of Abortion Law, 32 WASHBURN L.J. 166, 171–
72 (1993).
186. See supra Section II.A.
187. See CTR. FOR AM. WOMEN & POLITICS, GENDER DIFFERENCES IN VOTER
TURNOUT ( 2017), http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/sites/default/files/resources/genderdiff.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3723-4R87]; Catherine Rampell, Why Women Are Far More Likely to Vote
than Men, WASH. POST, July 14, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/catherinerampell-why-women-are-far-more-likely-to-vote-then-men/2014/07/17/b4658192-0de8-11e4-8c9a923ecc0c7d23_story.html?utm_term=.239d693606f9.
188. Bachiochi, supra note 129, at 632 n.163; cf. Akhil Reed Amar, Concurring in Roe, Dissenting
in Doe, in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra note 5, at 152, 152 (arguing that laws
enacted after women were granted the constitutional right to vote should be viewed differently than
laws enacted when women were denied the right to vote).
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women self-identify as pro-life.189 Hence, the decision to move the locus of control
of abortion from the democratic process to the Supreme Court is a decision to
distrust women as political actors.
Distrusting women as political actors is reflective of the deeply problematic
nature of a movement that purports to speak for women, and yet which advocates
views that most women reject. The abortion rights movement, after all, defends late
term abortions which the vast majority of women reject.190 The abortion movement
defended an abortion movement, D & X abortion (partial birth abortion), which
most women reject.191 The abortion movement opposes many regulations of
abortion which most women support.192 Hence, the abortion rights movement
seeks to maintain the locus of control over abortion policy in courts in part because
it allows the movement to continue its illusion of speaking for American women,
even as it profoundly distrusts the viewpoints of a majority of American women.
F. Deciding Not to Abort in Contemporary America
The riddle of anti-abortion women who abort has suited the abortion rights
movement, for it offers an opportunity to respond to a significant problem: the lack
of allegiance of women to the movement. It is, after all, awkward for a movement
that purports to advocate for women to face the opposition of nearly half of women
who self-identify as pro-life, and the ambivalence of many others who reject many
forms of abortion which the abortion rights movement supports.193 The abortion
rights movement has implicitly argued that if anti-abortion women anyway choose
abortion, then anti-abortion women as a group can be dismissed, their views
discarded without the necessity of reply. Of course, reasoning from anecdote in this
fashion is hardly logical. It can hardly be surprising that a significant number of
anti-abortion women abort, given the extreme pressures individuals experience to
abort, often from family members and male partners, the tendency in American life
and culture to abandon and isolate women in their “right to privacy,” the cultural
expectation to abort as the purportedly best response to a crisis pregnancy, and the
all too familiar human capacity to rationalize a seemingly “pragmatic” even if
189. See supra notes 158–67 and accompanying text.
http://news.gallup.com/poll/1576/abortion.aspx
190. See
Abortion,
GALLUP,
[https://web.archive.org/web/20180710115053/http://news.gallup.com/poll/1576/abortion.aspx]
(last visited July 10, 2018) (finding that in 2007, 72% of those polled thought “late term” and “partial
birth” abortions should be illegal); Poll: 80 Percent of Women Support Late-Term Abortion Bans,
FEDERALIST ( Jan. 19, 2016), http://thefederalist.com/2016/01/19/poll-80-percent-of-womensupport-late-term-abortion-bans/ [https://perma.cc/V2T9-LQL2]; Emily Swanson & Mark
Blumenthal, Abortion Poll Finds Support for 20-Week Ban, HUFFINGTON POST ( July 11,
2013, 7:25 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/11/abortion-poll_n_3575551.html
[https://perma.cc/RR8T-S499].
191. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000);
Abortion, supra note 190 (finding that in 2007, 72% of those polled thought “late term” and “partial
birth” abortions should be illegal).
192. See supra notes 189–91 and sources cited therein.
193. See supra notes 158–67, 190–91 and accompanying text.
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unethical decision. Nonetheless, from some number of anti-abortion women who
abort the abortion rights movement has tended to take the inference that pro-life
beliefs make no little or difference at all in individual women’s abortion decisions.194
For example, Petchesky states:
The same woman who avers that abortion is “terrible” or “wrong”
may also insist on her need or right to have one; at the very least, she will
act on that belief, whatever her professed convictions. Escalation of the
“right to life” propaganda campaign depicting abortion as murder and
fetuses as innocent babies has apparently influenced how people feel and
talk about abortion, but not what they choose to do about it.195
This tendency to dismiss as irrelevant the views of the majority of women who
either identify as pro-life, or who remain in the ambivalent middle on abortion,
illustrates the profound disrespect of the abortion rights movement toward women.
Since some anti-abortion women purportedly speak by their actions of undergoing
abortions, the views and words of all anti-abortion women are disregarded. Antiabortion women are dismissed as hypocritical, inconsistent, and naïve, and
influenced by anti-abortion “propaganda,” and rigid religious teaching.196 By such
reasoning the abortion rights movement tends to dismiss as irrelevant women’s
moral reasoning on abortion.
This dismissal of women’s moral reasoning on abortion is reflected in the
research articles of the Guttmacher Institute.197 The Guttmacher Institute certainly
provides useful and significant research on a variety of reproductive issues, but from
an explicitly abortion rights, rather than neutral, perspective.198 It seems fair to
regard Guttmacher as simultaneously a useful research institute and also as a part
of the abortion rights movement, given the organization’s explicit and consistent
advocacy for reproductive rights including specifically the legal availability of
abortion services.199
In this context, it is fascinating that while Guttmacher states a purpose in
“examining the factors underlying women’s decisions to terminate their
pregnancies,”200 the Institute seems eager to dismiss the possibility that women’s
moral choices on abortion could have anything to do with the dramatic decline in
the numbers and rates of abortion in the United States.201 The decline is dramatic
194.

See, e.g., PETCHESKY, supra note 136, at 369; infra notes 169-71, 197-203 and accompanying

text.
195. See PETCHESKY, supra note 136, at 369.
196. See, e.g., Arthur, supra note 171; Arthur, supra note 169.
197. GUTTMACHER INST., STRATEGIC PLAN: 2016–2020 (2016), https://www.guttmacher.org/
sites/default/files/report_pdf/guttmacherstrategicplan2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/EYZ4-GLTZ].
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 4.
201. See Rachel K. Jones & Jenna Jerman, Abortion Incidence and Service Availability in the
United States, 49 PERSP. ON SEXUAL REPROD. HEALTH 17 (2017) (suggesting that the decline in
abortion rates was due to some combination of increased contraceptive use and decreased access to
abortion services due to facility closure or newly implemented state policies); Joerg Dreweke, New

First to Printer_Smolin (Do Not Delete)

2018]

ABORTING REASON AND EQUALITY

9/10/2018 10:26 AM

705

as current abortion rates are the lowest ever recorded in the more than forty years
since Roe, with the numbers of abortions per 1,000 women of reproductive age cut
by about 50% from the peak in this period.202 The details of the debate over the
causes of these declines in abortion are beyond the scope of this paper. What is
important here is that the Guttmacher-related publications either ignore entirely the
very question of whether women’s moral reasoning on abortion might have an
impact on the steeply declining numbers and rates of abortion, or else seek to
debunk the possibility of women’s moral reasoning having an impact, perceiving
the very concept as essentially anti-abortion propaganda.203 This eagerness to
dismiss the possibility that women’s moral reasoning may play a role in abortion
rates represents another aspect of the abortion rights movement’s disrespect toward
women, and in particular toward the moral reasoning of women.
The abortion rights movement’s dismissal of the moral reasoning of women
regarding abortion is a part of the movement’s agenda of being pro-abortion rather
than merely “pro-choice.” If the movement were truly neutral on the morality of
abortion but simply trying to protect and empower women’s moral choices on
abortion, the movement would welcome and seek evidence that women’s moral
choices on abortion were consequential to the rate of abortions. Instead, the
movement assumes that abortion is moral, and indeed is the best response to many
or most unintended pregnancies.204 Abortion rights literature, such as the
Guttmacher Institute’s reports and statements, portray abortion as an innately moral
and helpful medical service furthering the agenda of reproductive health and rights,
rather than a profoundly personal and difficult question of personal morality.205
Thus, women who choose not to have abortions in circumstances of unintended
pregnancies compounded by difficult life circumstances are seen as implicitly
irresponsible, in the way that anyone who declines a useful and effective medical
treatment could be seen as irresponsible.206
Thus, even abortion rights advocate Petchesky notes: “For the liberal, it is not
the woman who gets an abortion who is ‘selfish,’ but the one who doesn’t––when
she is too young or too poor or too ‘incompetent.”207 Petchesky roots this “liberal-

Clarity for the U.S. Abortion Debate: A Steep Drop in Unintended Pregnancy Is Driving Recent Abortion
Declines, GUTTMACHER INST. (Mar. 18, 2016), https://www.guttmacher.org/gpr/2016/03/new-clarityus-abortion-debate-steep-drop-unintended-pregnancy-driving-recent-abortion
[https://perma.cc/
M7DP-RR6Y] (arguing instead that the decline in abortion rates was due to a decrease in unwanted
pregnancies, most plausibly resulting from increased contraceptive use).
202. Induced Abortions in the United States, GUTTMACHER INST. ( Jan. 2018),
https://www.guttmacher.org/fact-sheet/induced-abortion-united-states [https://perma.cc/7GMNEE8N].
203. See, e.g., Jones & Jerman, supra note 201; Dreweke, supra note 201.
204. See, e.g., GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 197; KATHA POLLITT, PRO: RECLAIMING
ABORTION RIGHTS (2015).
205. See, e.g., GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 197.
206. Cf. id.; PETCHESKY, supra note 136, at 376.
207. PETCHESKY, supra note 136, at 376.
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utilitarian”208 perspective in a legacy of “eugenics” and “bourgeois morality” that
“justifies abortion in the name of ‘quality over quantity’” and teaches that “‘maternal
duty’ involved rational planning and budgeting, of children as well as household
economies.”209 The rhetoric of the Guttmacher Institute falls into this “liberalutilitarian” camp, with its constant monitoring of unintended pregnancies and
explicit endorsement of the view that “reducing the unintended pregnancy rate is a
national public health goal.”210 From this perspective, abortion of unintended
pregnancies itself becomes a kind of public health mandate, given Guttmacher’s
view that “[b]irths resulting from unintended or closely spaced pregnancies are
associated with adverse maternal and child health outcomes, such as delayed
prenatal care, premature birth, and negative physical and mental health effects for
children.”211
From this pro-abortion (rather than simply pro-choice) perspective, the antiabortion and morally-ambivalent views of women are an obstacle to be overcome,
in service of a “liberal-utilitarian” public health agenda. Hence, the dismissal of
women’s moral reasoning regarding abortion is not an accident, but deeply woven
into the structure and foundations of the current abortion rights movement.
The theme of the anti-abortion women influenced by rigid religious teachings
and anti-abortion propaganda is also common in abortion rights literature,
sometimes with the implication that women are essentially victims of their own
religious and moral beliefs.212 Again, a truly “pro-choice” movement would not
need to constantly attack, belittle and bemoan the religious and moral anti-abortion
views of women, but rather would respect the agency of women.
This dismissal of the role of women’s anti-abortion viewpoints on the
numbers of abortions is flawed. While some anti-abortion women choose to abort
when faced with unintended pregnancies and difficult circumstances, many others
choose to nonetheless give birth. Anecdotes exist in both directions, indicating that
there must logically be some statistical significance to anti-abortion viewpoints.213

208. Id.
209. Id. at 375.
210. Unintended Pregnancy in the United States, GUTTMACHER INST. (Sept. 2016),
https://www.guttmacher.org/fact-sheet/unintended-pregnancy-united-states [https://perma.cc/
684H-C6B8].
211. See id.
212. See PETCHESKY, supra note 136; Arthur, supra note 169; Arthur, supra note 171.
213. Cf. PETCHESKY, supra note 136; Arthur, supra note 169; Arthur, supra note 171; Christina
Doell, I Told Planned Parenthood I Was Keeping My Baby and They Said They Couldn’t Help, STUDENTS
FOR LIFE (Feb. 10, 2017), http://studentsforlife.org/2017/02/10/i-told-planned-parenthood-i-waskeeping-my-baby-and-they-said-they-couldnt-help/ [https://perma.cc/33H5-VMXA]; From Relief to
Regret: Readers’ Experiences of Abortion, BBC ( Jan. 30, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine38775641 [https://perma.cc/7BX9-EUDH]; I Don’t Know if I Should Get an Abortion or Keep the
Baby?, BABYCENTER (Feb. 1, 2012), https://www.babycenter.com/400_i-dont-know-if-i-should-getan-abortion-or-keep-the-baby_11087255_799.bc [https://web.archive.org/web/20180608195414/
https://www.babycenter.com/400_i-dont-know-if-i-should-get-an-abortion-or-keep-the-baby_
11087255_799.bc]; Raquel Kato, I’m That Girl - That Girl That Got Pregnant, FOCUS (Oct. 19, 2012),
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Indeed, even according to Guttmacher Institute statistics, close to half of all
pregnancies in the United States are unintended, with about 40% ending in abortion
and about 60% ending in birth.214 Thus, the majority of unintended pregnancies are
not aborted, despite Guttmacher’s essentially negative viewpoint of such
pregnancies.215
Deciding not to abort in contemporary America requires resistance to the
“liberal-utilitarian” moral viewpoints portraying abortion as a moral duty. Hence,
Petchesky notes that “[m]any subjects in abortion studies ‘want a child’ but say that
abortion is the necessary and harder choice because of external circumstances.”216
Many women face what Petchesky characterizes as oppressive conditions and harsh
realities in which “parents are unsupportive or condemning, boyfriends angry or
withdrawn, school peers taunting and stigmatizing . . . conditions in which the
genuine desire for a child is thwarted by poverty, inadequate housing, lack of a
supportive partner, or the unavailability of child care.”217 Indeed, women articulate
not just that they want “a child” as Petchesky delicately puts it, but “the baby,”218
indicating a consciousness that a non-fungible human being already exists, with
abortion perceived as “still taking a life.”219 It is fascinating that Petchesky is at pains
to argue that “the oppressiveness of the conditions does not negate the authenticity
of the decision” to undergo an abortion,220 but has no interest in those similarly
situated women who meet the “oppressiveness of the conditions” with a decision
to not abort and give birth instead. The lack of interest in these women, and in the
“authenticity” of their decisions, provides the clue that no matter how
sympathetically women may appear to be listened to, it is through the lens of a proabortion, rather than merely pro-choice, agenda.
In addition, one might have thought that women’s rights advocates would
express more concern with the apparently common situation of women who would
prefer to continue a pregnancy and specifically want “the baby,” choosing to
undergo an abortion due to oppressive situations. The additional aspect that many
of these women believe that the abortion they are choosing is “taking a life” similarly
does not appear to concern most abortion rights advocates, except insofar as they
perceive the woman’s anti-abortion views as an obstacle to the woman’s liberation,
or a reason to negate anti-abortion viewpoints. The abortion rights movement in
short appears to care far more about advocating for abortion than advocating for

https://focusoncampus.org/content/im-that-girl-that-girl-that-got-pregnant [https://perma.cc/
NP8F-M7XB].
214. See GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 134.
215. See Unintended Pregnancy in the United States, supra note 210.
216. PETCHESKY, supra note 136, at 372.
217. PETCHESKY, supra note 136, at 372–74 (Petchesky’s exact language is “harsh realities” and
“the oppressiveness of the conditions.”).
218. Id. at 373 (citing CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 77 (1982)).
219. Id. (citing GILLIGAN, supra note 218).
220. Id.
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women; the movement seems more interested in explaining away women’s views of
prenatal life and abortion, than in respecting those views.
III. RELIGION, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, AND ABORTION
While obvious, it bears repeating that the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution explicitly protects religious freedom,221 while by contrast the
abortion right was written into the Constitution by the Supreme Court in 1973.222
It is a part of the hubris of evolving constitutionalism to think that a right viewed
as fundamental from the origins of the Constitution, more than two hundred years
ago, should consistently give way to a right created by the Court two generations
ago. The hostility of so many today to religious liberty in the name of judiciallycreated rights is a sign that evolving new rights is not cost-free, but comes with the
risk and actuality of displacing those rights that were originally provided in the
written Constitution.
That being said, the point of this Article is that religious proponents of the
pro-life perspective are not aberrant eccentrics seeking to harm women in the name
of obscure and outmoded religious dogma. Rather, religious proponents, in general,
are seeking to remind American law and culture of fundamental values deeply
rooted and still prized in American culture. Religious pro-life proponents present
publicly accessible reasons for their positions which are understandable in both
secular and religious terms. In addition, religious proponents are not seeking to set
aside settled science in favor of sacred scripture or long-held tradition, but rather
are reminding the courts and society not to obscure or set aside the basic scientific
facts of prenatal human life. Religious proponents of the pro-life position, many of
whom are women, moreover are presenting a reasonable interpretation of what it
would mean to respect women, as a group and individually, in the context of
abortion––and of why abortion rights in fact are built upon a lack of respect for
women, both as a group and individually.
Further, religious and secular pro-life proponents are not trying to take society
back to some idealized or demonized past stage, but are trying to remind society of
what abortion means today, in the context of today’s scientific understandings and
in the context of today’s issues related to gender relations, sexuality, and family life.
Indeed, it seems that many abortion rights activists are still focused almost
exclusively on past battles of freeing women from patriarchal control, while many
younger women and men experience a world where abandonment and lack of
commitment are also significant issues. The abortion liberty may facilitate forms of
patriarchy that marry a purported ethic of sexual freedom with continuing
exploitation of women’s bodies.
Fundamentally, it is the abortion rights movement that is discriminatory:
against the unborn and against religious persons and organizations. The abortion
221.
222.

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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rights movement is also discriminatory against women in several senses. The
movement is built upon a lack of respect for women as democratic actors, a lack of
respect for the conscience and views of individual women, and attempts to build
female equality on making women more like men.
Thus, while certain laws or lawsuits may present the issue of a religious
accommodation regarding abortion, such constellation of legal issues should not
confuse the fundamental position of religion in American society as to the abortion
issue. Pro-life religious beliefs are a call to inclusion of all human beings as deserving
of recognition before the law as persons, an application of contemporary scientific
understandings, and recognition of the deeply problematic dilemmas women face
in relationship to abortion.
Of course, this is an idealized portrayal of religious pro-life activism; however,
while not always accurate, it is accurate enough to form a basis for recasting the
relations of religion and abortion. Religious proponents must dare to come to the
table regarding abortion as full participants unbowed by demands to present
themselves as conscientious objectors to the values of American society. At their
best, pro-life religious advocates represent broadly-held and deeply-rooted
American values, and make a valid, if uncertain, case for representing the future of
America.

